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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Ali S. YAZD and Parvin Yousefi, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION, Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 20050444. 
Sept. 1, 2006. 
Background: House purchasers brought action against vendor, alleging that vendor fraudulently 
concealed information contained in a report about a deep layer of collapsible soil present on land 
which vendor owned that was adjacent to the house. The Fourth District, Provo Department, Gary D. 
Stgtt, J., granted vendor's motion for summary judgment. Purchasers appealed, and the Court of 
Appeals, 109._P.3d 3_93_, reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehrinq, J., held that: 
(_1) a developer-builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose information known to him concerning 
real property, including property other than that conveyed to the buyer, when that information is 
material to the condition of the property purchased by the buyer; 
(2) genuine issue of material fact as to whether report describing collapsible soil conditions on 
adjacent land owned by vendor was "material" precluded summary judgment; and 
(3) genuine issue of material fact as to whether report could be expected to influence the judgment of 
purchasers buying house, such that information was important and material, precluded summary 
judgment. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
NEHRING, Justice: 
H 1 When Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi's Lindon, Utah home sank into the unstable *285 soil upon 
which it lay, they sued. They claimed that home-seller Woodside Homes fraudulently concealed 
information contained in a report, the "Delta report," about a deep layer of collapsible soil present on 
land that Woodside owned adjacent to the Yazd-Yousefi property. 
H 2 The district court granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Yazd-
Yousefi fraudulent concealment claims. It based its ruling on the undisputed fact that Woodside was 
unaware of unsuitable soil conditions either on the Yazd-Yousefi land or elsewhere in its development. 
The court of appeals reversed. 
H 3 We granted certiorari. We affirm the court of appeals' reversal of summary judgment. However, 
we reverse the court of appeals' holding that the Delta report was material as a matter of law. We 
also correct the court of appeals' misapprehension that the materiality of the Delta report is relevant 
to whether Woodside owed the homeowners a duty to disclose the contents to them. Finally, we hold 
that a developer-builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose information known to him about the 
composition or characteristics of any real property when that information is material to the suitability 
of the property purchased by the buyer. 
BACKGROUND 
H 4 In the early 1990s, Woodside undertook the development of the Panorama Point subdivision in 
Lindon, Utah. The subdivision included three parcels of land, the last of which was purchased in 1992 
from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which we will call the "Church." The Church had 
intended to construct a large structure on the property. The Church abandoned this plan, however, 
after the Delta report (named after the firm which compiled it) revealed that an excess of moisture-
sensitive collapsible soil made the site unsuitable for the contemplated building. The Delta report did 
not specifically evaluate the suitability of the site for a single family residence. 
11 5 The Church agreed to sell the parcel of property to Woodside. According to the sales contract, the 
Church was to provide a copy of the Delta report to Woodside. Woodside claims it never saw the 
report. 
U 6 Before the Yazd-Yousefi home was built, Woodside obtained its own study of the soil conditions on 
two other parcels that comprised Panorama Point. The Yazd-Yousefi lot was within the area covered 
by the study. The soil study indicated the presence of collapsible soil to an average depth of 
approximately two and one-half feet. Accordingly, Woodside formulated a plan to dig out the 
collapsible soil and reduce the grade of these parcels between six and eight feet. After the work was 
completed, William Gordon, an engineer, inspected the area at the behest of Woodside and 
pronounced the soil fit to support a house. In 1995, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi contracted with 
Woodside to purchase a lot and build a home in Panorama Point. Woodside did not disclose the 
contents of the Delta or Woodside's own soil reports to Mr. Yazd or Ms. Yousefi. 
U 7 Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi moved into their home in September 1995. By 1996, cracks appeared in 
the foundation and the driveway. Doors would not open or close. Evidence of excessive settling 
abounded. Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi accepted Woodside's efforts to repair the damage until April 
2002 when a prospective purchaser of the home discovered that, owing to the instability of the soil, 
major repairs would be required to shore-up the house and prevent additional damage. 
H 8 With this discovery, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi decided to seek legal relief. They sued Woodside. 
They alleged that Woodside's failure to disclose the presence of the collapsible soil in the area 
amounted to a breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure. The district court referred the Yazd-
Yousefi contract claims to arbitration; these claims do not concern us here. The district court then 
dismissed the Yazd-Yousefi fraudulent nondisclosure and concealment claims. The district court based 
its ruling on a determination that Woodside had neither real nor constructive knowledge of the 
continued presence of collapsible soil on the buyers' lot. 
H 9 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district court. The court of 
appeals concluded that *286 the Delta report did contain material information that Woodside had a 
duty to disclose to the buyers and, since the question of whether Woodside actually had knowledge of 
the report was in dispute, that summary judgment was improperly granted. 
ANALYSIS 
B 
[1] 11 10 In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that 
the nondisclosed information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party 
failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate/' Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 
UT80, H 9, 31 P.3d 572. These elements are presented in inverse order of importance. As we will 
see, this reverse ordering of elements may have led the court of appeals to apply a flawed analytical 
process that nevertheless yielded the correct result: a reversal of the district court. 
I. WOODSIDE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. YAZD AND MS. YOUSEFI CREATED A LEGAL DUTY 
H 
[2] H 11 We have stated that " [ i ] t is axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort 
absent a duty." Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). Any analysis of a tort 
claim, then, begins with an inquiry into the existence and scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the 
defendant. 
[3] U 12 The court of appeals, however, began its analysis by examining the materiality of the 
Delta report following the sequence of elements set out in Mitchell. The court of appeals then wasted 
little time reaching the conclusion that u[t ]here is little question that the information contained in the 
Delta report would have been material to the Buyers in this case/' Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 
2005 UT App 82, fl 9, 109 P.3d 393. 
H 13 With its finding of materiality in hand, the court of appeals moved on to the matter of duty. The 
court appeared to link the materiality of the Delta report to the existence of Woodside's duty when it 
stated, "We can say, however, that if Woodside possessed the Delta report, or had knowledge of its 
content, prior to the sale with the Buyers, it had a duty to disclose the information to the Buyers." Id. 
H 10. It is important that the court of appeals' opinion not be read to suggest that the materiality of 
the Delta report created Woodside's duty to disclose the contents of the report to Mr. Yazd and Ms. 
Yousefi. Indeed, materiality becomes an issue only after a legal duty has been established. 
£41 H 14 The determination of whether a legal duty exists falls to the court. I t is a purely legal 
question, and since in the absence of a duty a plaintiff will not be entitled to a remedy, it is the first 
question to be answered. See Lgxeland^_746J>_.2d_atJ66. 
EL £5] H 15 From where does a duty arise? To properly answer the duty question, a court must 
understand that the structure and dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to the 
duty. 'The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law. As always, resolution of this issue 
begins with an examination of the legal relationships between the parties, followed by an analysis of 
the duties created by these relationships/' Id. 
£61 £21 H 16 A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a 
duty than one, for example, in which parties are in privity of contract. Age, knowledge, influence, 
bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive ability are but the more prominent among a multitude 
of life circumstances that a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by one party 
to another. Where a disparity in one or more of these circumstances distorts the balance between the 
parties in a relationship to the degree that one party is exposed to unreasonable risk, the law may 
intervene by creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does not 
reward exploitation of its advantage. 
{81 {91 11 17 Legal duty, then, is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships. 
DeBrv v. Vallev Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("Duty is not sacrosanct 
in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations*287 of policy which lead the 
law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted)). A person who possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no 
legal duty to communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists. 
[10] [11] H 18 An example which illustrates this point is the "special relationship" doctrine in 
tort law. A person has no legal duty to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger unless 
the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a "special relationship" with either the 
stranger or the potential victim. Rather, "[ t ]he duty to control another person may arise where a 
special relationship exists." Wilson y^ Valley Mental Healthy 9_69_P.2d 416, 419 {UtaJ i l998) ; see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1977) (stating that a duty is premised on a special 
relationship); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231f 236 (Utah 1993) (adopting Restatement 
position). Here, it is Woodside's status as builder-contractor that gives rise to its legal duty to the 
home buyers. The communication of material information to Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi is one of the 
obligations that flow from Woodside's assumption of its legal duty. 
H 19 There are occasionally instances in which a court is called upon to make policy choices based on 
assessments of social, economic, and technological conditions. To cite but one example, the 
maturation of the industrial revolution and, in particular, the ever lengthening chain of participants in 
the manufacture of goods cut deeply into the doctrines of caveat emptor and privity of contract that 
had served well an agrarian and economically insular nation prior to the last century. This changed in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., where Justice Cardozo held that manufacturers must exercise 
reasonable care to protect consumers and others who, despite a lack of privity or direct contractual 
contact with the manufacturer, may come into contact with their products. 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 
ISLE. 1050 (1916). 
[12] H 20 Typically, courts cede authority over matters of policy to the political branches of 
government. When policy considerations bear on a subject lodged firmly within the court's sphere, 
like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make the policy judgments necessary 
to get the law right. 
H 21 We have never explicitly recognized that a duty is owed to buyers of homes by builder-
contractors. Insofar as we have signaled a willingness to impose this duty, it has been by indirection 
and expressed in dictum. In Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, H 9, 94 P.3d 919, we turned away an 
attempt by the Smiths, owners of a home that had been constructed on unsuitable soil, to impose a 
duty on the developer of the subdivision where the home was located. Our reasons for doing so had 
as much to do with the conclusions that we reached about the scope of knowledge acquired and the 
responsibility assumed by the Smiths' contractor-builder as with the issue of whether the developer 
knew of the poor soil conditions and whether that knowledge was material. 
H 22 Our focus in Smith was not on whether the relationship between the Smiths and their builder-
contractor imposed a legal duty to disclose information about soil conditions. After all, the builder-
contractor was not a party to the lawsuit. The inquiry into the builder-contractor's role was, instead, 
directed at whether parity existed between what the builder-contractor knew about the condition of 
the soil that lay beneath the Smiths' house and the developer's knowledge of the same soil instability. 
This was relevant to our analysis of the developer's duty because we had formerly indicated that a 
remote purchaser who had no privity of contract with a developer might nevertheless recover for 
breach of the developer's duty to disclose unsuitable soil conditions to a previous unsophisticated 
purchaser who had no knowledge of the adverse conditions. Id. % 25, 
% 23 Smith required us to define limits on the right to recover from remote parties. One limiting 
principle that we recognized and applied in Smith was that a duty to disclose material information is 
extinguished once the information is communicated or otherwise acquired by the party to whom the 
duty was owed. Id. H 17. 
*288 H 24 Modern home construction requires a high degree of knowledge and expertise, including 
knowledge of soil conditions. We have found that the disparity in skill and knowledge between home 
buyers and builder-contractors leads buyers to rely on the builder-contractor's expertise. Based on 
these observations, we chose to adopt in Loveland, 746 P.2d 763, a statement of duty borrowed from 
Wyoming o f " 'reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some 
type of ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which 
he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential 
building/ " Id. at 769 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo.1984)). 
\ 25 The imposition of this duty had the effect in Smith of imputing to the builder-contractor the 
knowledge of deficient soil conditions that the Smiths accused the developer of failing to disclose to 
them. The imputation of this knowledge, however, cut off any duty the developer may otherwise have 
owed to future owners of the property, including the Smiths. 
H 26 Although we did not recognize the duty of the builder-contractor in the context of a direct action 
for recovery brought by a home buyer in Smith, we today extend its application to that setting. To do 
otherwise would fatally undermine the legitimacy of our reasoning in Smith. 
I I . THE MATERIALITY OF THE DELTA REPORT IS IN DISPUTE AND PROPERLY LEFT TO THE FINDER OF 
FACT TO DETERMINE 
[13] H 27 The court of appeals held the Delta report to be material as a matter of law. Woodside 
takes issue with this determination for three reasons: the Delta report did not concern the Yazd-
Yousefi lot, the court of appeals misread the Delta report in ways that led it to believe it was relevant 
to the Yazd-Yousefi lot when it was not, and Woodside's soil study on the Panorama Point property 
including the Yazd-Yousefi lot superseded any materiality to which the Delta report might make claim. 
U 28 We do not believe that the Delta report has earned the designation of "material" as a matter of 
law and therefore reverse the court of appeals on this point. Neither do we accept Woodside's 
invitation to stamp the Delta report "immaterial" as a matter of law. Rather, we find that the question 
of the report's materiality is best suited for the finder of fact to answer. 
% 29 Woodside's contention that the Delta report cannot be material because it describes soil 
conditions on land other than the Yazd-Yousefi lot has little to recommend it. Property boundaries are 
seldom drawn with soil composition in mind, and information about the suitability of soil for 
supporting a dwelling would more likely than not be relevant to predicting the soil conditions on 
similar adjacent land. We decline to categorically deem immaterial all information concerning property 
not owned by the party affected by unsuitable soil conditions. For the purpose of determining 
materiality in this case, property boundaries are legally insignificant. 
H 30 Whatever errors in interpreting the Delta report may have predisposed the court of appeals to 
conclude that the report was material as a matter of law were not so significant as to persuade us to 
summarily rule the report immaterial. The Delta report disclosed soil instability of a magnitude that 
caused the Church to scuttle its building plans for the site. There were no obvious physical or 
topographical features that would distinguish the Church parcel from the other portions of Panorama 
Point. In our view, these considerations are sufficient to place the question of the Delta report's 
materiality in dispute. 
H 31 Finally, we reject Woodside's assertion that by commissioning its own soil study on property that 
included the Yazd-Yousefi lot, it rendered immaterial all other information bearing on the soil 
conditions at Panorama Point. Woodside insists that it had no knowledge of the Delta report. Based on 
this assertion, its soil study was necessarily prepared without the benefit of information contained in 
the Delta report concerning conditions on the adjacent parcel. At this stage * 2 8 9 of the litigation, we 
do not know whether knowledge of soil conditions on the Church parcel would have affected the 
Woodside soil report. Certainly, it is possible that it could. If the finder of fact were to determine that 
Woodside knew of the Delta report but failed to inform its soils expert of its existence and contents, 
the weight of the Woodside soil report could be substantially diminished. 
I I I . WE REFINE THE DEFINITION OF "MATERIALITY" IN THE CONTEXT OF MATTERS THAT MUST BE 
COMMUNICATED BY A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR 
[14] U 32 In holding that the Delta report was material as a matter of law, the court of appeals 
relied on a definition of materiality as " 'something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence would think to be of some importance in determining whether to buy or sel l / " Yazd v. 
Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, H 9, 109 P.3d 393 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Hermansen JA Tasulis, 2002JUT_52, S-29, 4_8_P._3d 235). In particular, the court of appeals focused on 
the word "some" in the definition. We confess that "some" as used in our description of materiality is 
ambiguous. When used in a context in which additional precision concerning quantity or quality is 
sought, the word "some" is inherently ambiguous. "Some" is a word that refers to an unspecified 
quantity or quality. It is a word that diminishes precision, not adds to it. When the young man 
proclaims to his mother-in-law, "That was some dinner," we are left with considerable uncertainty 
about the mother-in-law's talents as a chef. We believe that when the court of appeals stated that 
"we cannot say as a matter of law that the information would not have been of some interest to the 
Buyers," id±+ it treated "some" in a way that would permit matters of lesser importance to qualify as 
material. This interpretation is not what we intended. 
H 33 We take this opportunity to clarify the definition of materiality as the term is used as an element 
of fraudulent concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure. We believe that requisite clarity can be 
achieved by deleting the word "some" from the definition we adopted in Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, % 
29, 48 P.3d 235. 
H [15] U 34 To be material, the information must be "important." Importance, in turn, can be 
gauged by the degree to which the information could be expected to influence the judgment of a 
person buying property or assenting to a particular purchase price. In this case, we conclude that a 
finder of fact could reasonably find that the contents of the Delta report meet this definition of 
materiality. Therefore, we decline to pass on the status of the Delta report as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
H 35 The three elements of fraudulent concealment are best described in this order: (1) there is a 
legal duty to communicate information, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing 
to disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed information is material. In this case, these elements are yet to 
be adjudicated and remain to be proved. The most important element is the existence of a duty, 
which arises from the relationship between the parties. We hold that a developer-builder may owe his 
buyer a duty to disclose information known to him concerning real property, including property other 
than that conveyed to the buyer, when that information is material to the condition of the property 
purchased by the buyer. Both knowledge of the Delta report and its importance to the buyers remain 
contested factual issues that bear on the existence of a duty. Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' 
reversal of summary judgment. 
% 36 Finally, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that the Delta report was material as a matter 
of law. We leave the trier of fact to determine whether the Delta report was known to Woodside and 
whether its content was sufficiently important such that its disclosure would have influenced the 
decisions made by the buyers with respect to this property. 
H 37 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRA1MT, and Judge 
CHRISTIANSEN concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
*290 H 38 Having disqualified herself, Justice PARRISH does not participate herein; District Judge 
TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN sat. 
Utah,2006. 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp. 
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